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“The Path to Prosperity in Afghanistan and Central Asia: Obstacles at the 
Crossroads” 
By Owen Lloyd 
ABSTRACT 
Despite America’s lengthy nation-building project in Afghanistan, many Afghans still lack the 
basic resources and security necessary for a viable nation. Furthermore, the insecurity in 
Afghanistan is increasingly spilling over into their neighbors, stressing an already fragile region. 
While we in the West have largely forgotten Afghanistan, its neighbors look on with trepidation 
as they prepare for potential unrest. With vast amounts of natural resources and increased 
competition between the Russians and Chinese over the region, Afghanistan and its insecurity 
could lead to continued Central Asian economic and political stagnation. Despite the dangers in 
failure, inconsistent action and a destabilizing mission have plagued the U.S. Afghanistan 
mission for ten years. If the U.S. is going to continue to be involved in state building operations, 
a holistic plan that integrates cultural, political, military and economic policies must be 
implemented and dynamically updated to suit the prevailing conditions. While the road to a 
stable Afghanistan will be difficult, it is possible. Admitting defeat now will only create a more 
costly and chaotic future for Afghanistan and its neighbors that we may not be able to afford. 
 
By wisdom a house is built, and through understanding it is established; through knowledge its 
rooms are filled with rare and beautiful treasures. 
- Proverbs 24:3 
Afghanistan the Lynchpin 
The success of an independent Afghanistan will be critical in the social and economic 
development of Central Asia.  The position of Central Asian nations at the crossroads between 
Asia and Europe lends them an ever-growing importance in the shaping of the new global world. 
Therefore, as the U.S. experience in Afghanistan continues to demonstrate, it is necessary to 
understand this region and its inhabitants in order to make appropriate policy decisions. 
However, the efforts of the U.S. in Afghanistan has thus far been plagued by inconsistent action 
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and lack of coordination between civilian and military reconstruction groups, symptoms 
stemming from the lack of an overarching plan. If the U.S. continues to act in this region of the 
world, it must recognize the cultural, political, and economic elements that impede state-building 
and regional development.  
 
With increased globalization, the rise of hostile non-state groups, and persistent resource 
scarcity, poverty and conflict pose dangerous consequences for the larger world community. 
While Central Asia is kept nominally stable by autocratic leaders left over from the Soviet era, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan all share destabilizing elements, capable 
of leading to failed states and civil wars. As Afghanistan’s history aptly exhibits, failed states in 
this region are easily compromised by groups with hostile intent towards the U.S. and its allies. 
Additionally, despite a global economy that has enabled many formerly poor nations to reach 
relative prosperity, much of Central Asia remains at medieval levels of development. The 
principal danger is that further conflict will squander more human and natural resources, 
depriving Central Asia of economic prosperity and derailing the wider Asian continent. With this 
in mind, the dividends of wise foreign participation and systematic internal reforms will prove to 
be immensely rewarding to Afghanistan and the region.  
Afghanistan: The Graveyard of Empires 
Afghanistan is a landlocked nation of desert steppe, extreme elevation changes, and fertile 
valleys. While these features geographically isolate the country, it has long been a pivotal hub in 
regional commerce and politics because it lies between the Far and Middle East.  Numerous 
historical and modern invasions attest to the tensions and liabilities implicit with life at the 
crossroads. Historian Stephen Tanner argues that a geographic rather than a political map 
explains why “Afghanistan’s claustrophobic passes have born mute witness to armies of 
Persians, Greeks, Mauryans, Huns, Mongols, Moghuls, British, Soviets, and Americans -- among 
others -- including many of the most famous captains in history.”1 This cyclical pattern of 
invasion and associated phenomena is the most salient force in the shaping of Afghanistan, both 
past and present. 
 
It is no surprise that the formation of modern Afghanistan took place in the tumult of Russia and 
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Great Britain’s imperial designs. Between Britain’s Indian empire and Russia’s desire to control 
ever-larger swaths of Central Asia, Afghanistan served as a battlefield and buffer state, in 
constant flux with the fortunes of the great powers.2 This so-called Great Game of Central Asia 
led to Afghanistan’s other eponym -- graveyard of empires -- as neither the British nor the 
Russians were ever able to fully subdue Afghanistan despite a century of attempts.3 The British 
were the first to commit a pattern of blunders that would later haunt the Soviets and to an extent 
hinder the U.S. endeavor in Afghan nation-building. Historian Louis Dupree attributes the 
British calamity to “the occupation of Afghan territory by foreign troops, the placing of an 
unpopular emir on the throne, the harsh acts of the British-supported Afghans against their local 
enemies, and the reduction of the subsidies paid to the tribal chiefs by British political agents.”4 
 
While it is fashionable to relate many current wars to aspects of older conflicts,5 in the case of 
Afghanistan, a pervasive sense of déjà vu proves especially hard to ignore.6 The Soviet era was a 
recent, clear, and documented instance of failed intervention and counterinsurgency operations in 
Afghanistan. Though many specific lessons from the Soviet decade in Afghanistan are perhaps 
applicable to today’s conflict, as far as this essay is concerned, more useful analysis lies with 
how this era paved the way for civil war and the rise of the Taliban.  
 
Afghanistan’s precipitous downfall began in 1978 when Soviet-backed leftist Afghan army 
officers deposed President Muhammad Daud Khan. The communist regime that followed 
attempted to transform Afghanistan along Marxist-Leninist lines, aiming to align Afghanistan 
with the Soviet hegemony and secure Moscow’s largesse.7 The social and religious reforms 
dictated by the new regime, however, provoked Islamists and traditionalists into an ever-growing 
insurgent movement that by 1979 had gained control over most of the provinces.8 The Soviet 
Union, worried that this uprising could spread to the Central Asian republics9, installed a 
moderate communist leader in the hopes that this would appease the anti-regime forces.10  
 
The loose tribal and ethnic coalition called the Mujahedeen attracted an eager league of 
benefactors from the U.S. to China, who jumped at the opportunity to bleed the Soviet Union dry 
through proxy war.11 While the Mujahedeen were initially quite broad in its composition, former 
Afghan Army officer Ali Jalali describes how the movement became more extreme as the “U.S. 
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intelligence believed that the Islamists were the most zealous and devoted anti-Soviet fighters 
and deserved to be supported.”12 Jalali experienced firsthand how this aid, channeled through 
similarly radical Pakistani intelligence, “marginalized mainstream Afghan forces that embraced 
moderate religious and nationalistic orientation, but lacked strong leadership.”13 Through this 
support and determination, the Mujahedeen claimed victory over the weary Soviet forces after 
ten years of bloody conflict. The U.S. calculation to support the more radical Afghan factions 
would, however, be Pyrrhic triumph. Jalali counters that “the cost of Washington’s victory in the 
Afghan power game was the advancement of the Jihadi mentality which motivated a worldwide 
terrorist network centered in Afghanistan.”14  
Civil War ad infinitum 
Immediately after the Soviet defeat, the loss of the “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” mentality 
soon digressed into open war between the multitude of Afghanistan’s ethnic, religious and 
political divisions. Jalali further describes this power struggle as involving “neighboring states 
pursuing strategic interests, and extra-regional players with ideological, security and or economic 
stakes in the chaos.” 15 In combination with what Hekmat Karzai of the Centre for Conflict and 
Peace Studies characterizes as “a culture of international neglect,”16 Jalali adds that “neighboring 
countries furthered their policies by engaging and supporting rival afghan factions while fueling 
internal strife and blocking the emergence of a broad based legitimate government.”17 In a 
statement that encapsulates the whole situation, he attests that “the turmoil was both the cause 
and consequence of state failure in the war-torn country.”18  
 
In this power vacuum of lawlessness, violence, and poverty, a group called the Taliban was 
poised to gain control of Afghanistan. According to Karzai, the Taliban traces its name from the 
Arabic word for “student,” a reference to its historic relationship to deeni madaris or Islamic 
schools.19 However scholarly its roots, the Taliban holds to the extreme views of a dogmatic sect 
of Sunni Islam called Deobandism, distinguished from moderate Islam in pursuing an active 
Jihad with global ambitions.20 Empowered by U.S. contributions, the Taliban “gained in 
popularity by presenting [itself] as a viable and constructive political alternative, since within 
weeks [it] had restored security in the southern provinces.”21 At this juncture it is important to 
note that now, as then, most Afghans value security and relative stability, perhaps even at the 
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expense of severely curtailed freedoms and civil rights. Initially, however, the promise of the 
Taliban included such lofty goals as those outlined by Historian Martin Ewans22: 
 to end the conflicts between rival Mujahedeen groups that continued to disintegrate the 
country and cause lawlessness 
 to restore peace and security for all Afghans and protect their rights and liberties 
 to disarm the populace, removing weapons that were abundant after Afghan-Soviet war 
 to unite the people under one central government 
 to end the corruption by various parties and establish a credible and accountable 
government 
 to enforce Sharia law, establish the Islamic state, and preserve the Islamic character of 
Afghanistan 23  
However, as time went on, the Taliban found it difficult to harmonize the pursuit of these goals 
with the preservation of the “Islamic character of Afghanistan.” In view of Afghanistan’s 
inherent splits, a common Islamic bond was arguably contrived. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
Taliban had to resort to other methods in order maintain control. Influenced by the extremist 
ideology of its backers — from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan intelligence (ISI) — the Taliban 
adopted severe repression and Orwellian tactics as a political expediency.24  
 
Furthermore, the transnational terror group Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, found this nation 
an ideal host for the training and export of its brand of extremism. With jihad infrastructure left 
over from the fight against the Soviets, Osama bin Laden was quickly able to mobilize further 
support from many “wealthy Arabs throughout the Middle East…as [he was] were keen on 
seeing a doctrine similar to Wahhabism spread across Central Asia.”25  
 
By the end of 1997, the Taliban had imposed severe rules and regulations on of much of the 
country. Karzai describes how “couples were stoned to death if caught in adultery; thousands of 
widows were banned from employment; schools and colleges were closed to girls; T.V. music 
and soccer were all banned.”26 Significantly, as the Taliban reneged on their social contract, it 
saw Afghans voting with their feet as they “sought to remove their children from the scene in 
order to evade conscription into the front-line action against the Northern Alliance.”27 Journalist 
Ahmed Rashid uses stronger language to explain that the Taliban’s ethos was “utterly alien to 
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Afghan culture and tradition.”28 With this growing disquiet, the quick initial fall of the Taliban 
after the coalition invasion in 2001 is largely attributable to groups such as the Northern Alliance 
and others who had long chafed under Taliban rule.29 
Obstacles to a New Afghanistan 
In a speech to the Council of Foreign Relations, Senator Kerry quoted a U.S. military officer 
who told him with frustration, “We haven’t been fighting in Afghanistan for eight years. We’ve 
been fighting in Afghanistan for one year, eight times in a row.”30 Rashid documents how the 
American plan initially rejected nation-building, as President Bush had declared as late as 
September 26, 2001, “We are not into nation-building, we are focused on justice.”31 As the 
obvious need for aid became apparent, a large coalition of international military and 
reconstruction forces under U.N. and U.S. direction became involved. Initially this nation-
building impetus was tempered with Secretary of State Collin Powell’s qualification that “It isn’t 
a huge Marshall Plan kind of investment.”32 With such vague goals and shortsighted revenge, the 
major international players have been caught off guard with the Hobbesian decline of 
Afghanistan. 
 
Militarily, U.S. planners also failed to understand the changing nature of conflict in an age of 
laser-guided bombs and predator drones against soldiers on horseback. It is easy to underestimate 
the degree to which the Vietnam War continues to affect American political and military thought 
and practice. Warfare for American forces has become characterized by a style of combat first 
proven in the first Gulf War, one that stresses remote weapon delivery systems over conventional 
infantry operations. American aversion to using ground troops in operations from Somalia 
through Afghanistan testifies to U.S. leaders’ fear of another Vietnam-style war.33 U.S. 
experiences in nation building have proven even less fortuitous, as Rashid reports that  
Washington has been involved in just six of such operations—Cambodia, East Timor, 
Haiti, Somalia, and the states of the former Yugoslavia. None of them was initiated by 
the United States, except for Somalia, which failed. The United States never took part in 
UN peacekeeping operations, although it has funded and supported many of them.34  
The lack of a clear mission, compounded by the concurrent war in Iraq, explains much of the 
past malaise in Afghanistan that the “eight, one year wars” analogy describes. In a recent address 
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at West Point, President Obama did not gloss over the facts that violence is again breaking out in 
the provinces, the opium trade is expanding, and the Taliban is resurfacing. The Commander in 
Chief explicitly acknowledged that, “although a legitimate government was elected by the 
Afghan people, it's been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, 
and insufficient security forces.”35 In committing an additional thirty thousand troops and all that 
goes along with them, it appears that the U.S. will be getting serious about nation-building in 
Afghanistan. 
A Brave New World 
With the increased security provided by the influx of troops, an exceedingly rare window of 
opportunity has opened for rebuilding Afghanistan and solidifying its currently shaky 
foundations. First and foremost, the availability of more troops enables the U.S. and its allies to 
extend a greater tactical flexibility over a larger territory rather than remaining separated from 
the general population in forward operating bases. However, this operation must be done with 
extreme caution; propaganda painting U.S. troops seen as occupiers and killers can gain valuable 
support for the Taliban’s cause. Karzai points out that “Operations where force is used should be 
controlled, because if one innocent civilian is killed, it diminishes the goodwill of a whole 
family, a community and a tribe.”36 More and more attention is being paid to winning the hearts 
and minds of Afghans37 because a viable Afghan government must beat the Taliban at providing 
security and order. Unequivocally, General William Wallace posits that conflicts like that in 
Afghanistan can be won “only by conducting military operations in concert with diplomatic 
informational and economic efforts. Battlefield success is no longer enough; final victory 
requires concurrent stability operations to lay the foundation for lasting peace.”38 39 
 
If violence is ousted from the outer provinces and security nominally restored, the central 
government in Kabul will be able to spread its reforms and services to those who are currently 
isolated. Any government must have the infrastructure to provide public goods and services to its 
citizens. Therefore roads, electricity, and communication networks must be set up and 
maintained. The current situation in Afghanistan is analogous to that of San Francisco if all 
bridges in and out of the city were all destroyed and the only way in to the area was through the 
southern base of the peninsula. While increased troop numbers will help provide basic needs and 
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basic infrastructure, the political, economic, and agriculture reforms discussed later will prove 
ineffective unless these can first be secured.  
Unlimited Liability 
The largest challenges to a viable Afghanistan are governmental corruption and staggering 
economic hurdles. While the 2009 Transparency International rankings listed Afghanistan at 179 
out of 180 countries in terms of perceived governmental corruption (from least to most), the 
amount of international involvement in Afghanistan certainly separates it from Myanmar at 178 
and Somalia at 180.40 Thus while this number is unfortunate, it is pragmatic to expect such a 
rating from a country only recently thrust into democracy. This conclusion is not to say that this 
level will be forever acceptable, but rather that incremental improvements should be pursued.  
 
Ultimately the largest roadblocks in Afghanistan’s development are represented in the U.N.’s 
Human Development Index. The HDI measures such criteria as “a long and healthy life, access 
to knowledge, and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita.” 41 HDI 2009 
places Afghanistan with a composite score of .352 out of 1, second only to Niger, whose .340 
puts it at the bottom of the scale. In comparison with its Central Asian neighbors, Tajikistan 
earns a .688, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan .710 each, Turkmenistan a .739, and Kazakhstan a 
.804.42 When the HDI is extrapolated with figures from the CIA World Factbook, the seriousness 
of these problems is clear.43  
 
The median age of the Afghanistan’s population is 17.6 years old and 44% of the population is 
between the ages of 0 to 14, while only 2.4% is over 65.44 While this rate is concurrent with that 
of a population that has suffered 30 years of war and out-migration, it more worryingly attests to 
the low levels of medical access in a country where life expectancy is 44.6 years.45 Furthermore, 
if such a young populace were educated, such an age discrepancy would not be as critical. As 
things stand, literacy rates are 43.1 percent for males and an incredibly low 12.6 percent for 
females, who on average complete only four years of school.46 Even four years is surprisingly 
high considering the Taliban prohibition on female education. As 24% of the population is 
urbanized, it is apparent that a large uneducated cohort will need to be integrated into the 
national economy if Afghanistan is to grow.47 
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The impending human capital crisis is compounded by Afghanistan’s hobbled economy, 
dependent largely on illicit opium trade. The World Factbook calculates that if the country’s 
entire poppy crop were processed it would yield 648 metric tons of pure heroin.48 An opium-
based economy is a huge dilemma for the new government since according to economist Alastair 
Mckenchnie, the crop comprises 35 percent of GDP and “employs as many as 2 million 
people.”49 Unfortunately, the greater evils of opium production include funding insurgent forces 
as well as contributing to “other criminality such as the appropriation of custom revenues and 
illegal taxation, trafficking in people and body organs, forced labor, practices similar to slavery, 
export of archeological artifacts, arms trading, land seizures, and real estate speculation based on 
armed force or corruptly obtained contracts.”50  
 
Reducing or eliminating the opium trade would tremendously reduce governmental corruption 
and other societal ills. However, the catch is that with everyone wanting a piece of the pie, 
curtailing production becomes a nearly impossible endeavor without incurring significant 
political and economic costs. While reliance on a single crop will never lead to long-term 
economic development, cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan demonstrates that the short-term costs 
are also unsustainable if Afghanistan wishes to join the licit world economy. Mckenchnie 
presents an ugly circle in which continued opium reliance leads to further corruption, diminished 
government capacity and rule of law, and finally to increased macroinstability.51 While 
additional coalition forces will largely reduce the rate of poppy growing, the problem with 
corruption and a lack of suitable economic replacements remain Afghanistan’s limiting factors.  
A New Way Forward  
Taken as a whole, the disastrous recent history of Afghanistan coupled with current economic, 
societal, and political disorder adds up to an exceedingly difficult equation with an ever-elusive 
solution. Like a puzzle whose pieces are always changing shape, Afghanistan’s final 
configuration will prove difficult to determine. Nevertheless, new study of what makes societies 
and nations fail or succeed is increasingly useful in plotting out a rough map of Afghanistan’s 
future development requirements. Paul Collier, former director of Development Research at the 
World Bank and current economic professor at Oxford University, has moved past common 
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assumptions on what makes countries poor and offers solutions through quantitative analysis.  
 
Collier, in his book The Bottom Billion, focuses significantly on how proper governance affects 
growth and whether growth can be attained with poor governance.52 He finds that while good 
governance can improve the growth by up to 10%, terrible governance can destroy the economy 
much more decisively.53  
 
Extrapolating his findings to Afghanistan is especially troubling given its high government 
corruption and economic immaturity. Fortunately, a growing economy can exist under a poor 
government if certain criteria can be met. Bangladesh is the model here, as its economy 
continues to grow despite being plagued by poor governance and a recent military takeover.54 55 
Bangladesh’s government, although corrupt, adopted relatively liberal export policies that 
enabled it to export large amounts labor-intensive goods competitively.56 Collier writes, “the 
government merely has to avoid doing harm rather than actively doing much good; exporters 
simply need an environment of moderate taxation, macroeconomic stability and a few transport 
facilities.”57 Such reforms are especially appealing for Afghanistan as “such a development 
strategy need not be very demanding of government” to ensure success.58 Additionally, if 
Afghanistan specializes in similar high labor goods and services with moderately liberal trade 
policies, the country could regain its importance as a regional trade hub. In order to achieve such 
liberal trade policies, Collier presents governmental checks and balances as key in preventing 
conflict and poverty. Without them, “patronage will often win out over honest politics in the 
struggle for votes.”59 
 
Collier also identifies the lack of coastal access as a large contributor to perpetual poverty, as 
landlocked nations’ trade options are greatly diminished or dictated by their coastal neighbors’ 
whims.60 If Afghanistan were surrounded by more prosperous countries, like Switzerland in 
Europe, then this would be less of a problem. However, since Afghanistan is surrounded by the 
poor and landlocked nations of Central Asia, instability in any of these countries drastically 
affects the others. For comparison, Collier calculates the global “spillover” average: for every 
additional 1% neighboring countries grew, the neighbor country would grow by .4%.61 For 
Afghanistan however, Collier posits that “globally, resource scarce landlocked countries seem to 
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make a special effort to piggyback on the growth of their neighbors—for the landlocked the 
spillover is not .4 percent but .7 percent.”62 Afghanistan should then orient itself to becoming a 
regional trade facilitator because it has few natural resources of its own. Furthermore, 
partnerships with various regional coastal nations could further its global trade exports. With 
time and the improvement of other Central Asian republics’ trade policies, a Central Asian co-
prosperity sphere like the European Coal and Steel Community would contribute significantly to 
sustained growth and economic diversification.  
 
Many Americans view Central Asia as an inconsequential backwater, difficult to locate on a 
map. However, as Collier comments, after the 9/11 attacks “the whole topic of failing states is 
fashionable because people have an uneasy sense that it probably does matter.”63 For Central 
Asians, a viable Afghanistan will be pivotal in the growth of their economies. Collier calculates 
that over its history, a failed state can cost itself and its neighbors $100 billion in total.64 If 
applied to Central Asia, a wider regional community is imperative to giving millions of people 
significantly higher standards of living.  
 
In the past, the U.S. has led the international community in pursuing nation-building in 
Afghanistan with inconsistent effort and incomplete understanding. However, with the recent 
influx of security forces and other resources to aid Afghanistan’s fledgling democracy, a new 
chapter has been opened in the region’s history. This opportunity must not be wasted and 
historical mistakes must be learned from and corrected. Collier writes, “Donors should be 
committed for the decade not just the first couple of high-glamour years” and also, “International 
security forces should likewise be committed for the long haul.”65 Ultimately Afghanistan and 
the neighboring nations bear the responsibility for their futures and serious reform must be taken 
in order to ensure success. The current obstacles at the crossroads are great, and the easy 
solutions have already been tried. However, if and when Central Asia is able to overcome such 
impediments, the benefit to their people and the world will far outweigh current costs.   
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